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ABSTRACT
This paper studies constitutional restrictions on the tax base that protect future generations
from expropriation and improve the optimality of investment in Intergenerational Public Goods
(IPGs). The choice of the tax base matters because it affects how intergenerational (IG) spillovers
are capitalized into assets that are owned by current generations, and thus the IG politics. We show
that with an income tax base, present generations expropriate future generations and produce
inefficiently low levels of IPGs. By contrast, with a land tax base, IG expropriation using debt is








In every society present generations choose how much to invest in Intergenerational
Public Goods (IPGs), such as public capital and the environment, and how much
debt to pass to future generations. This gives rise to a basic question in political
economy: Which institutions best protect future generations from expropriation and
generate optimal investment in IPGs? This institutional problem is challenging because
future generations do not vote, and the evidence suggests that present generations are
imperfectly altruistic.1
Although the prospects for future generations appear grim at ﬁrst sight, recent work
(described in the next section) has shown that some institutions are capable of solving
the problem through “intergenerational (IG) capitalization”. Selﬁsh present genera-
tions do not care directly about the IG spillovers. However, they do care about other
variables that aﬀect their well-being, such as the future price of the assets that they
own, or the future value of their social security beneﬁts. An institution that capitalizes
the IG spillovers into one of these variables indirectly induces present generations to
care about their descendants.
In this paper we study constitutional restrictions on the tax base that give present
generations incentives to internalize IG spillovers. A tax base restriction limits the type
of taxes that the government can use to raise revenue, but not the level of expenditures.
Tax base restrictions are important because, as we show, they have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on how IG spillovers are capitalized into assets that are owned by current generations,
a n dt h u so nI Gp o l i t i c s .
This paper is, in essence, an exercise in comparative institutional analysis. We
d e v e l o pas t y l i z e dp o l i t i c a le c o n o m ym o d e li nw h i c ht h e s ei s s u e sa r i s e ,a n dc o m p a r e
the outcomes generated by two constitutional rules: (1) a restriction to an income
tax base, and (2) a restriction to a land tax base. First we show how the tax base
restrictions aﬀect the extent to which IG spillovers are capitalized into land values.
Then we show the eﬀect that the capitalization properties have on IG politics.
Our results show that an appropriate choice of constitutional restrictions on the tax
base profoundly aﬀects IG exchange. With an income tax base, present generations
expropriate future generations and produce ineﬃciently low levels of IPGs. By contrast,
with a land tax base, IG expropriation using debt is impossible, the level of investment
in IPGs is higher and, for some types of IPGs, Pareto optimal.
These results have implications for the design of tax systems. A constitution could
protect future generations by requiring the use of a multi-tier tax system, which divides
the government budget into several well-deﬁned tiers, and puts hard constraints on the
1See, for example, the studies of Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoﬀ (1992,1997).2
tax base that can be used to ﬁnance the expenditures in each category. The system
would have at least two tiers: (1) an intergenerational tier containing the debt and
programs that generate IG spillovers; and (2) an intragenerational tier containing all
other programs, including redistribution and corrective taxation. Our results suggest
that the IG tier should be ﬁnanced exclusively with land type taxes, but do not impose
any constraints on the tax base for the second tier.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related litera-
ture. Section 3 describes the basic model. Section 4 compares the outcomes generated
by an income and a land tax base. Section 5 introduces some practical concerns. Sec-
tion 6 concludes by discussing the practical implications of our results for the design
of tax systems. The proofs are in the appendix.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to several literatures. First, Poterba (1994), Bohn and Inman
(1995), Alt and Lowry (1994), and Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996) study budgetary insti-
tutions such as capital accounts.2 The goal of these institutions is also to protect future
generations, but they work through a diﬀerent mechanism. Instead of relying on “IG
capitalization”, they restrict the government’s ability to issue debt. For example, some
institutions restrict the use of debt to the ﬁnancing of concrete capital projects that
have to be approved in a special referendum.
Second, Rangel (2002) and Boldrin and Montes (1998) study investment in IPGs in
economies without durable assets. They show that majority rule institutions generate
equilibria in which “political capitalization” takes place: present selﬁsh generations
vote to invest in IPGs because otherwise future voters will cut their social security
beneﬁts. Unlike the land market capitalization studied here, “political capitalization”
is sustained by cooperative equilibria in inﬁnitely repeated games, and, as a result,
there are always bad equilibria in which investment in IPGs does not take place. By
contrast, we show that a restriction to a land tax base always generates a positive level
of investment in IPGs.
Third, Oates and Schwab (1988,1996), Glaeser (1996), Kotlikoﬀ and Rosenthal
(1993), Rangel and Conley (2002), and McKinnon and Nechyba (1997) also study how
to protect future generations by inducing the capitalization of IG spillovers into land
values. The diﬀerence with our paper is the mechanism at work. Here we look at
centralized institutions in which the IG spillovers aﬀect land prices solely through their
eﬀect on the taxes of future generations. By contrast, this literature looks at decen-
tralized institutions where interjurisdictional competition provides the capitalization
2See also the Report of the President’s Commission on Capital Budgeting (1999).3
force: future voters prefer jurisdictions with less debt and more IPGs and thus bid up
the price of land in those jurisdictions. Finding a way to protect future generations
without relying in federalism is important because some IPGs, such as R&D or military
capital, cannot be decentralized, and historically central governments have issued large
amounts of debt.
Fourth, the paper is also related to the literature on the incidence of taxation, which
takes tax changes as exogenously given, and studies the burden that they generate.3
For example, Feldstein (1977) shows that the introduction of a land tax immediately
capitalizes all future taxes into land prices. By contrast, here we study how the (known)
incidence properties of diﬀerent tax bases aﬀect the politics of IG redistribution and
investment.
Finally, like the famous Henry George Theorem (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, ch. 17),
this paper shows that a restriction to a land tax base has attractive properties. However,
the relationship between the results stops there. Here the land tax base is attractive
because of its political economy properties. By contrast, the Henry George Theorem
shows that in static economies, under some special conditions, the equilibrium land
values equal the cost of providing the optimal level of the public good.
3B a s i c M o d e l
3.1 Economy
Consider an economy with two periods, t =1 ,2, and two homogeneous generations, α
and β.E a c hg e n e r a t i o ni so fs i z eN. There are three goods: a private numeraire good,
land, and an intergenerational public good (IPG).4
T h et i m i n go fe v e n t si ss u m m a r i z e di nF i g u r e1 . G e n e r a t i o nα is alive in period
1. Each member receives an endowment of L
N units of land and w units of the private
good. Generation β is born between periods 1 and 2. Each member is endowed with
w units of the private good but no land. At the beginning of period 2 there is a land
market in which generation β buys the land from generation α. At this point generation
α consumes its wealth, exits the economy, and dies.
The preferences of generation α are equal to their life-time wealth.5 The preferences
of generation β are given by u(c)+v(l)+h(G), where c, l and h denote, respectively,
the consumption of the private good, land, and IPG. u(·), v(·), and h(·)a r et w i c e
continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly concave, and satisfy the Inada conditions.
3See Auerbach and Hines (2002) and Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1997) for summaries of this literature.
4The results in this paper also hold in models with an inﬁnite number of generations. The two
period model used here, however, provides a better environment to understand the forces at work.
5This assumption is made just to simplify the exposition. If agents can borrow and save, this is
equivalent to assuming that generation α maximizes a utility function U(c1,c 2,l).4
Let p denote the price of land, and
λ(p|x) ≡ argmax
l≥0
u(x − pl)+v(l)( 1 )
denote the demand for land of a member of generation β who has wealth x.T h e
following properties, proven in the appendix, will be used repeatedly in the analysis.









∂x → 0a sλx → 0.6
Since agents are homogenous, in equilibrium they must purchase L
N units of land.
Property 1 says that, for any for any level of after tax wealth x, there is a unique land
price that clears the market. Property 2 follows from the fact that, since under our
assumptions all goods are normal, agents only spend a fraction of each extra unit of
wealth on land. Finally, Property 3 says that land prices do not change with income
when the demand for land is suﬃciently income inelastic.
Figure 1 also describes the timing of political choices. At time t =1t h e r ei sa n
election in which generation α makes two decisions: how much debt to issue, denoted
by D, and how much to invest in the IPG, denoted by I.A tt h ee n do ft =2t h e r ei s
an election in which generation β chooses additional expenditures on the IPG, denoted
by E. Negative levels of D represent public savings. Generation β always honors the
debt. The gross interest rate is exogenously given and equal to 1.
The production function for the IPG is given by
G = θI +E.( 2 )
We assume that θ>1 so that it is optimal to invest in the IPG at t =1 . I ft h i s
were not the case, the IPG would become a regular public good, and the IG incentive
problem would disappear. θ −1 measures the strength of the IG spillovers.
In the basic model we assume that the IPG is non-reversible: E ≥ 0. Examples of
this type of IPG include the environment and investments in public infrastructure. In
section 4.3 we provide straightforward extensions to reversible IPGs (E ≥− θI)a n dt o
pure IPGs (E =0 ) .
The reader may wonder why we do not develop the basic results for the seemingly
simpler case of pure IPGs. There are two reasons. First, that case misses an essential
property of most of IPGs, which is that future generations can provide the public
6λp and λx denote, respectively, the derivative of the land demand function with respect to price
and wealth.5
good, albeit at a higher cost, if present generations do not do so. For example, the
need for future environmental expenditures depends on the amount of damage done in
the present. Second, as we show below, pure IPGs are a knife-edge case.
3.2 Institutions
Political decisions are made by majority rule voting over the set of feasible policies, or
by any other institution, such as Downsian competition, that selects Condorcet winners
as the unique equilibrium outcomes whenever they exist. Since agents are homogenous,
the existence of a Condorcet winner is trivially guaranteed: it is equal to the preferred
policy of the representative voter. The politics become more complex in section 5 where
we extend the results to the case of heterogenous agents.
We consider two institutions which only diﬀer on the type of tax base restriction
imposed on the government: a restriction to an income tax base and a restriction to a
land tax base. The ﬁrst institution is denoted by I, the second by L.7
With an income tax base, all taxes, positive and negative, are collected using income
taxes. Given that agents are homogenous, without loss of generality we can model the
income tax as a lump-sum tax.8 Thus, the income taxes in periods 1 and 2, as a








Note that the debt reduces the taxes of generation α and increases the taxes of gener-
ation β.
With an income tax base, all taxes, positive and negative, are collected using a tax









Finally, to simplify the exposition we also assume that there is a debt-ceiling Dmax.
The role of this constraint is further explained below.
7Tax base restrictions come in diﬀerent degrees of completeness. At one extreme, a complete tax
base speciﬁes a detailed mapping from government expenditures to the taxes paid by each individual
as a function of his behavior. At the other extreme, an incomplete tax base speciﬁes that certain types
of taxes cannot be used, but does not pin down the level of the taxes that are allowed. In this paper
we study the political economy properties of complete tax bases.
8In section 5 we extend the analysis to the case of heterogenous agents and consider more general
income taxes.
9Previous studies (e.g., Skinner (1991)) have emphasized the diﬃculties of administering a land
tax. These studies, however, have considered land-taxes based on market values, which are diﬃcult
to measure and monitor, instead of taxes per-unit of land.6
3.3 Equilibrium
To characterize the outcomes generated by the two institutions we need to deﬁne the
following objects for (k = I,L): s ≡ (θI,D) is a state variable summarizing the level
of IPG s1 = θI and the level of debt received from the ﬁrst generation; pk(s)i s
a capitalization function describing the equilibrium price of land; Ek(s)i sap o l i c y
response function describing the expenditures in IPGs at time 2; Gk(s) ≡ θI + Ek(s)
is the level of the IPG consumed by generation β; ck(s) is the amount of private good
consumed by generation β;( Ik,Dk) is the outcome of the election at time 1; and,
ﬁnally, Gk ≡ θIk +Ek(θIk,Dk) is the equilibrium level of the IPG.
DEF 1: An equilibrium for I is given by (pI(·),EI
2(·),II,D I) satisfying:
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DEF 2: An equilibrium for L is given by (pL(·),EL(·),IL,D L) satisfying:








)+h(θI + E)]; (8)











Note a few important features of these deﬁnitions. First, the institutions only diﬀer
on how policy choices map into taxes. In L the amount of taxes paid by each agent
depends on his market choices. In particular, land taxes aﬀect the total cost of owning
land but not the wealth of the agents (see (9)). By contrast, in I taxes are independent
of market choices and aﬀect after tax wealth (see (6)).7
Second, the outcome of the election is given by the representative agent maximiza-
tion problems described in (5), (7), (8) and (10). Furthermore, since τk(·) L
N = Tk(·),
the change in the tax base has no eﬀect on how taxes are shared in equilibrium: each
agent pays 1
Nth of the taxes in both cases. Thus, any diﬀerences between I and L must
be due to their capitalization properties.
Third, since agents are identical, in equilibrium they consume an identical amount
of land. As described in (6) and (9), the land price adjusts in every state to get agents
to demand L
N units of land.
Fourth, agents have rational expectations. This assumption plays a crucial role in
the results. When generation α votes at time 1, it anticipates the consequences of its
decisions on land prices (see (7) and (10)). When the members of generation β decide
how much land to buy, they anticipate the taxes that they will be pay later in the
period (see (6) and (9)).
Fifth, agents are price takers and policy takers. In particular, when they choose
how much land to buy, they take the future political outcomes as given. As in the case
of the market, the justiﬁcation is that with suﬃciently large electorates agents do not
believe that they can aﬀect the outcome of the election.
3.4 Tax vs. Beneﬁt Spillovers
To understand the results in this paper is important to keep in mind that the actions
of generation α induce two types of eﬀects on generation β: tax and beneﬁt spillovers.
Tax spillovers arise because the total taxes paid by generation β, Ek(s)+D,d e p e n d
on the state of the world. In particular, each additional unit of debt increases future
taxes by 1 +
∂Ek(s)
∂D , and each additional unit of IPGs by
∂Ek(s)
∂s1 .
Beneﬁt spillovers arise because the actions of generation α aﬀect the level of IPGs
Gk(s) consumed by generation β.
In both cases, the spillovers result from the combination of the actions of generation
α and the reaction by generation β. Consider, for example, the eﬀect of increasing the
debt by one unit. In the absence of a behavioral response by generation β, this increases
the budget at time 2 by one unit, but has no eﬀect on the IPGs. Thus, it generates
a positive tax spillover, but not a beneﬁt spillover. However, as we show below, with
an income tax base generation β reacts by decreasing its expenditures in IPGs. This
generates additional negative tax and beneﬁt spillovers.
4 Income vs. Land Taxation
Before characterizing the outcomes generated by the two institutions, it is useful to
look at their general capitalization properties. Suppose that, for exogenous reasons,8
the government at t =2p r o v i d e sG units of the IPG and has to raise B units of taxes.
This requires a lump-sum tax B
N with an income tax base, and a land tax B
L with a
land tax base. The following result characterizes the capitalization functions pL(G,B)
and pI(G,B).











(iii) With an income tax base there is under-capitalization of tax spillovers:
L
∂pI




The proof of this result is simple and provides an essential intuition. Consider, ﬁrst,
the case of a land tax base. The equilibrium price of land is determined by the land
market clearing condition L
N = λ(pL(G,B)+B
L|w). By Property 1, pL(G,B)+B
L =
π(w). It follows that pL(G,B)=π(w) − B
L, beneﬁt spillovers are not capitalized, and
tax spillovers are fully capitalized.
Now consider the case of an income tax base. The equilibrium price of land is now
determined by the land market clearing condition L
N = λ(pI(G,B)|w − B
N). Property
1t h e ni m p l i e st h a tpI(G,B)=π(w − B











Properties 2 and 3 imply that L
∂p
I
∂B ∈ (−1,0) and goes to zero as λx → 0. In the
limit, when preferences are quasi-linear, pI(·) is constant and there is no capitalization
of either type of spillover.
This simple result has an important implication. In both institutions the choices of
generation α aﬀect land prices only through their eﬀect on tax spillovers. If generation
α leaves an extremely valuable IPG, but this has no impact on the taxes at t =2 ,t h e
beneﬁts are not capitalized!
The diﬀerence between the two institutions resides on how the tax spillovers aﬀects
land prices. With income taxation, an additional unit of tax spillovers increases prices
because, when future generation are richer, they demand more land. However, since
future generations also use the additional wealth to buy other goods, the capitalization
eﬀect is not a 100%. For example, if agents spend 30% of their income in land, the
capitalization eﬀect is 30%. By contrast, with land taxation the tax spillovers aﬀect
directly the total cost of owning land, but not wealth. In some sense, the income tax
base operates through income eﬀects, while the land tax channels the tax spillovers
directly into price eﬀects.9
4.1 Income Tax Base
The following result characterizes the equilibrium of the I institution.
PROP 2: I generates a unique equilibrium with the following properties:








(−1,0) if s1 < G
I
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for some some decreasing function G
I
(D).









(0,1) if s1 < G
I
(D)




(iii) There is maximal IG expropriation: DI = Dmax.
(iv) There is underinvestment in future generations: II =0unless θ and λx are
suﬃciently large.
(v) GI is Pareto ineﬃciently low.
We provide the intuition for this result in two steps. First we discuss what drives
the capitalization of the spillovers. Then we discuss the impact that the capitalization
function has on generation α’s incentives.
Consider, ﬁrst, the properties of the capitalization function. As we have seen before
only tax spillovers are capitalized. Thus, to understand how IPGs and debt are capital-
ized, we need to understand how they aﬀect the government budget B(s) ≡ EI(s)+D

































∂s1 measure the magnitude of the tax spillovers. The results then
follow easily from the properties of the policy response function EI(·), depicted in
ﬁgure 2 (bottom). Additional units of s1 either decrease taxes by less than one unit,
or have no eﬀect on taxes. By proposition 1, it follows that land prices go down by less
than one unit, or do not change. Similarly, since ∂EI
∂D ∈ (−1,0), each additional unit of
debt increases the taxes of the next generation, but by less than one unit since it also
reduces the expenditures in IPGs. Again, by proposition 1, it follows that land prices
go down, but by less than one unit.10
The intuition for why EI(·) satisﬁes these properties is also simple. As long as
EI(s) > 0, the government at time 2 is indiﬀerent between receiving an additional unit
of IPGs or an additional unit of private goods. Both decrease the amount of taxes that
the government needs to raise to provide a given level of IPGs by exactly one unit.
Furthermore, since the tax spillovers are not fully capitalized, the additional unit of
IPGs makes generation β richer and thus it increases its demand of IPGs. However,
since all of the goods are normal, the demand for IPGs goes up by less than the full unit.
As a result, expenditures in IPG go down but by less than the full unit. Furthermore,
as shown in ﬁgure 2, this implies that for high enough levels of IPGs, EI(s)=0 . A t
this point additional units of IPGs generate beneﬁt spillovers, but not tax spillovers.
A similar logic shows why EI decreases with D but less than one-to-one.
Now consider how these properties of the capitalization function aﬀect the incentives
of generation α. Each additional unit of debt decreases its tax bill by one unit but
decreases land values by less than one unit. Thus, it pays to expropriate and so
DI = Dmax. Now consider their incentives to invest in IPGs, shown in ﬁgure 2 (top).
Generation α has an incentive to increase s1 only if this increases land prices by a
suﬃciently large amount. Thus, by Proposition 1, it invests only as long as s1 generates
a tax spillovers and if the capitalization eﬀects are strong enough. Thus, it invests up
to G
I
(Dmax)w h e nL
∂pI
∂s1 ≥ 1
θ, and nothing if L
∂pI
∂s1 < 1
θ. Figure 2 depicts the later case.
By Proposition 1, we can conclude that generation α invests in IPGs only if θ and λx
are large enough.
Note the role that the debt ceiling plays in this institution. As long as Dmax +
EI(s) <N w ,g e n e r a t i o nβ always has enough resources to pay oﬀ the debt, and also
to invest in the IPGs when none are provided by the ﬁrst generation. Given this, land
prices are strictly positive in every state. The results also go through without the
imposition of a debt-ceiling, but the analysis is more cumbersome.10
Summarizing, although I is able to capitalize some tax spillovers, the magnitude of
the eﬀect is not suﬃcient to stop expropriation through the debt, or, in many cases,
to induce present generations to invest in IPGs. This motivates the central question of
this paper: can a change in the tax base improve outcomes?
4.2 Land Tax Base
The following result characterizes the equilibria of the L institution.
PROP 3: L generates multiple equilibria (but a unique equilibrium allocation) given
by:
10Since ﬁnancial markets would never lend an amount that exceeds the tax base of future gov-
ernments, without a debt ceiling it is necessary to keep track of the maximum amount of debt that
generation β could repay in every state.11
(i) EL(s)=m a x {G
L




(iii) Any level of debt is an equilibrium, but it generates no IG redistribution.
(iv) All investment in IPGs is done by generation α: IL = G
L
θ
(v) GL ≥ GI, with strict inequality if θ or λx are suﬃciently small or Dmax > 0.
(vi) GL is Pareto ineﬃciently low.
As before, we provide the intuition for the results in two steps.
Consider, ﬁrst, the properties of the capitalization function. As we have seen, a key
feature of this institution is that IG spillovers aﬀect the total cost of owning land, but
have no eﬀect on wealth. It follows that the price of land is given by
LpL(s)=Lπ(w) −(D + EL(s)); (11)
i.e., tax spillovers are fully capitalized. Then, by the properties of EL(·), depicted in









1i f s1 < G
L
0o t h e r w i s e
.
Note that, in contrast to I, the income elasticity of land demand plays no role in the
result.
With a land tax, generation’s β demand for IPGs is unaﬀected by s1 or D.T h i s
is a direct result of full capitalization. Each additional unit of IPGs makes generation
β richer by reducing the amount of taxes that the government needs to collect, but it
also makes it poorer by increasing the cost of land. The two eﬀects cancel each other
out. As a result, see ﬁgure 3 (bottom), each additional unit of IPGs reduces EL by
exactly one unit. Once more, this implies that EL(s) = 0 for high enough levels of s1.
A similar logic shows that EL is not aﬀected by the debt.
Now consider the impact of the capitalization eﬀects on the incentives of generation
α. With full capitalization IG redistribution is impossible since the tax spillover of
increasing the debt is exactly oﬀset by the decrease on land values. As a result, the
after tax wealth of generations α and β is independent of D, and any feasible level
of debt can be an equilibrium. Next consider the incentives to invest in IPGs, which
are depicted in ﬁgure 3 (top). As before, generation α does not produce beyond G
L
since only tax spillovers are capitalized. However, since the tax spillovers are fully
capitalized, generation α makes a proﬁt of 1− 1
θ on every unit of investment up to G
L
.
Thus, for all θ>1, all of the expenditures in IPGs are made by generation α.T h i s
falls short of full eﬃciency, but at least is “constrained eﬃcient” in the sense that the
most eﬃcient production technology is used.12
Figures 3 (top) can also be used to see why the equilibrium is Pareto ineﬃcient.
With θ>1 eﬃciency requires that all IPGs be produced in the ﬁrst period. At an
interior Pareto optimal allocation the level of investment in future generations is such
that MSB(s)=MSC(s), where MSC(s)=1
θ measures the marginal social cost of
investing in IPGs, and
MSB(s)=
￿







measures the marginal social beneﬁt, which is equal to generation β’s aggregate will-
ingness to pay for an additional unit of s1.F o rs1 < G
L
, the MSB equals one since, as
long as EL(s) > 0, additional units of IPGs are valuable only to the extent that they
decrease the tax cost of consuming a given level of IPGs.
As the ﬁgure shows, generation α invests optimally only if it is suﬃciently compen-
sated for every unit of investment up to G∗.G e n e r a t i o n β would like to commit to
compensate generation α for the cost of producing the additional IPGs, but it cannot
credibly commit to do so since, in the institutions studied in this paper, the only fea-
sible compensations are those that arise as the result market forces, and these forces
only capitalize tax spillovers.
It is important to emphasize that in this institution land prices can be negative
even though the total cost of owning land remains ﬁxed at π(w) > 0. As we have seen,







This function takes is lowest value at (0,D max). It follows that, even when debt is not
allowed (Dmax = 0), land prices can be negative out of equilibrium whenever G
L
>
Lπ(w). Along the equilibrium path, the lowest land price is given by pL(G
L
,D max)=
Lπ(w) −Dmax, which is positive as long as Dmax <L π (w).11
Negative prices are a natural feature of the land tax base. Agents agree to sell at
negative prices because, otherwise, they would be responsible for the taxes associated
with the land.12 In fact, as shown in (12), generation α always makes a proﬁt by selling
the land since the price exceeds the tax burden per unit of land by π(w).
Summarizing, a move from an income to a land-tax base generates full capitalization
of tax spillovers, which is suﬃcient to eliminate IG expropriation, and to always induce
the ﬁrst generation to carry out all of the investment in IPGs, as required by eﬃciency.
11Out of equilibrium negative prices arise only in a fraction of environments. For example, in the
Cobb-Douglass preferences of the form A logc + B logl + C logG, one can show that Lπ(w) > G
L
as
long as B>C . When this condition is satisﬁed, there is a debt-ceiling Dmax > 0 which guarantees
positive prices in and out of equilibrium. In general, negative prices arise when generation β’s taste
for the IPG is suﬃciently stronger than its taste for land.
12We assume that land taxes are collected after the land market just before generation α dies.13
4.3 Other Types of IPGs
N o wt h a tw eh a v ed e v e loped a basic understanding of how the two institutions work
we can easily extend the results to other types of IPGs.
Consider ﬁrst the case of reversible IPGs, where E(s) ≥ −θI, and future generations
can decide to de-invest part of the stock that is bequeathed to them. For example,
they could decide to sell excess government buildings or national parks. The model is
exactly as before with one exception: the constraint for generation β’s maximization
problem in (5) and (8) becomes E(s) ≥− θI. This innocuous modiﬁcation changes
the nature of the IG spillovers: now an additional unit of IPGs always generates a
tax spillover. Furthermore, since generation β can always consume excessive levels of
inherited IPGs, the marginal social beneﬁt of an additional unit of IPGs is always equal
to 1.
Another important case are pure IPGs, where E(s) = 0 for all s.H e r e , I P G s
generate beneﬁt spillovers, but not tax spillovers.
PROP 4: (i) In the case of reversible IPGs, IL is Pareto optimal, and II is Pareto
ineﬃciently low unless θ and λx are suﬃciently large.
( i i )I nt h ec a s eo fp u r eI P G s ,IL = II =0 .
The intuition for this proposition follows easily from our previous results. Since
pure IPGs do not generate tax spillovers, they are not capitalized, and generation α
has no incentive to produce them.
Now consider the case of reversible IPGs. Since each unit of IPGs costs 1
θ units to
produce, and generates 1 unit of private goods in period 2, optimality requires that the
ﬁrst generation invest it’s entire endowment. Clearly, generation α has an incentive to
do so only if L
∂p
∂s1 ≥ 1
θ for all s. With a land tax base, each additional unit of IPGs




By contrast, with an income tax base each additional unit of IPGs generates less than
one unit of tax spillovers, and that unit is capitalized by less than a hundred percent.
As a result, L
∂pI
∂s1 < 1
θ if θ or λx are suﬃciently small.
A comparison between irreversible, reversible, and pure IPGs provides additional
intuition for the forces at work. Generation α only cares about the impact of its deci-
sions on land prices. Thus, it internalizes the impact of its actions on the capitalization
function, but not on the well-being of future generations, as described by the MSB
schedule. It follows that an institution that generates a capitalization function that
approximates well the entire MSB schedule would induce the ﬁrst generation to make
optimal choices.
The income tax institution performs poorly because, as shown in ﬁgure 2, it provides
a poor approximation. By contrast, the capitalization function with land taxation14
approximates the MSB schedule well in the case of reversible IPGs, and extremely
poorly in the case of pure IPGs. For irreversible spillovers, the approximation is good
when θ is close to one, but not when θ is large.
4.4 Welfare
Ac o m p a r i s o no fp r o p o s i t i o n s1a n d2s h o w st h a tam o v ef r o ma ni n c o m et oal a n d
tax base increases the eﬃciency of the economy. Thus, it is natural to ask if there are
conditions under which the reform could be Pareto improving. The following result
s h o w st h a tt h i si sn e v e rt h ec a s e .
PROP 5: A move from an income to a land tax base increases the welfare of gener-
ation β and decreases the welfare of generation α unless Dmax =0 ,a n dθ and λx
are suﬃciently large. In that case, both institutions generate identical outcomes.
This result follows from the incidence properties of the two tax bases. Since the
introduction of a land tax immediately capitalizes all future taxes into the price of land,
the reform entails a massive redistribution from future to present generations. As a
result, the introduction of these institutions may require some form of compensation
that is ﬁnanced with non-land taxes. The compensations are likely to be large, but so
are the eﬃciency gains.
5E x t e n s i o n s
In this section we consider some complications that are important in the practical
application of our results.
5.1 Alternative Tax Bases
A couple of problems arise in the implementation of a land tax base. First, although
negative prices are a natural feature of the institution, they might be undesirable for
political economy reasons. In particular, if land owners have strong political clout their
taxes might be reduced when land prices drop suﬃciently. This destroys their incentives
to internalize the IG spillovers. The second concern is that land is not homogenous;
some land plots are better than others. The government could tax all land equally, but
this might be undesirable on an equity ground.
These two concerns motivate the extension developed in this section. We show
that any other durable asset, or combinations of assets, that are inelastically supplied
generate the same results. Examples include capital produced before the introduction
of the institution, and luxury durable goods such as pre-20th century art.15
Consider a simple extension of the model in which there are two assets traded at
prices p1 and p2. There is an inelastic supply Lk of each type. As before, agents are
homogeneous. The preferences of generation β now are given by u(c)+v1(l1)+v2(l2)+
h(G).13
Deﬁne a new tax base LM which speciﬁes the fraction of expenditures, σ1,σ 2 ≥ 0,
with σ1 +σ2 = 1, that is paid with taxes on each asset. The taxes per-unit of asset at












The deﬁnition of equilibrium for this institution is a straightforward extension of deﬁ-
nition 2.14
PROP 6: LM generates full capitalization of tax spillovers, but no capitalization of
beneﬁt spillovers: for k =1 ,2, for all s,
LkpLM
k (s)=Lπk(w) − σk(ELM(s)+D).
This results is a straightforward extension of proposition 1(ii) and thus we only
provide a sketch of the proof. As in Property 1, for any level x>0o fa f t e rt a x
wealth, there exists a unique pair of land-market clearing prices (π1(x),π 2(x)) such
that λk(πk(x)|x)=Lk








i.e., the price of each asset decreases exactly by the amount of the tax spillovers that it
bears, and each additional unit of tax spillovers decreases the total value of both assets
13v1(·) and v2(·) satisfy the same properties as v(·).
14An equilibrium for LM is given by (pLM
1 (·),p LM
2 (·)ELM(·),ILM,D LM) satisfying:
(i) Political equilibrium in period 2: for all s











(ii) Land market equilibrium: for all s and for k =1 ,2, pLM






(iii) Political equilibrium in period 1:











by one exactly one unit. It follows, for the same reasons as before, that generation α
fully internalizes the tax spillovers.
This result provides a solution to our two concerns. First, since the result holds
for any shares σ1 and σ2, and it can be trivially extended to the case of n assets, the
government could address the problem of heterogenous land by dividing the land stock
into several types and choosing an appropriate share for each type.
Next, proposition 6 implies that the price of asset k i sp o s i t i v e ,i na n do u to fe q u i -
librium, as long as σk <
Lkπk(w)
GLM+Dmax,w h e r eGLM = ELM(0,D max) denotes the highest
possible level of investment in IPGs by generation β. It follows that, by appropriately
choosing the tax shares, the number of assets, and the debt ceiling, the institution
can levy
￿
k Lkπk(w) units of revenue without generating negative prices. Thus, the
government can address the political feasibility problem by adding assets to the tax
base.
It is important to emphasize that the full capitalization results only hold for assets
that are inelastically supplied. To see why, recall the intuition behind Proposition 3.
With an inelastic asset and land taxation the total cost of land is unaﬀected by the
policies of generation α and thus the demand for land remains ﬁxed at L
N. This cannot
be an equilibrium with an elastically supplied asset because, when prices increase in
response to an additional unit of s1, so does the supply of the asset. Thus, generation
β’s equilibrium consumption of the asset must increase with s1. This can be the case
only if each additional unit of s1 increases land values by less than the full unit.
Our results can still be extended for the case of elastically supplied assets, such as
property (as opposed to land), but they take the form of a limit result: as the elasticity
of land supply goes to zero, the outcomes generated by the L and I institutions converge
to those characterized in propositions 1 and 2. It follows that, for suﬃciently inelastic
assets, an asset tax base still outperforms an income tax base.
5.2 Heterogenous Agents
In the basic model we have assumed that agents are identical. A natural concern is
that, since rich and poor voters pay diﬀerent shares of the taxes and own a diﬀerent
amounts of land, they may respond diﬀerently to the capitalization driven incentives.
In this section we explore the role of heterogeneity in our results.
Consider an extension of the model in which heterogeneity is introduced in the
simplest possible way. Agent i in generation α now receives an endowment of wi units
of the private good and li units of land. The aggregate endowments in both periods
and the characteristics of generation β remain unchanged.
I ti ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r dt oe x t e n dd e ﬁ n i t i o n s1a n d2t ot h i sc a s e .T h eo n l yt h i n gt h a t
changes are the political equilibrium conditions at t = 1. Now, instead of solving the17
maximization problems in (7) and (10), (Ik,Dk) is required to be a Condorcet winner
at t = 1, and its existence is no longer trivially satisﬁed.
Consider, ﬁrst, the eﬀect of introducing heterogeneity in institution L.W i t hl a n d








Since this inequality is independent of li and wi, it follows that agents’ policy pref-
erences do not depend on their land holdings or wealth. Thus, Proposition 3 still
holds.
Now consider institution I. The income tax base now speciﬁes how diﬀerent levels
of expenditures map into the amount of taxes paid by each individual. Suppose, for
simplicity, that agent i always pays a fraction η(i) of the taxes. Given this, agent i
optimal policy is given by
(II
i ,DI
i )= a r g m a x
I≥0,D ≤Dmax,I ≤Nw+D
[pI(s)li −η(i)(I −D)]









L denotes the share of land owned by agent i.
Now consider the role of the progressivity of the tax schedule on the policy prefer-
ences of a voter i = mv who has the median income. With a suﬃciently progressive
tax system, η(mv) < lmv
L . In this case, since the median voter pays a small share of the
taxes, he does not fully internalize the cost of public policy. Hence, he favors high levels
of investment in IPGs, and is opposed to issuing debt even when there is only partial
capitalization.15 By contrast, with a suﬃciently regressive tax system, η(mv) > lmv
L .
In this case the median voter opposes the production of IPGs and favors issuing debt.
We can conclude that, from an IG point of view, the attractiveness of an income tax
base increases with its progressivity (as measured by the diﬀerence between η(mv)a n d
lmv
L ).16 The intuition is simple. The income tax base under-capitalizes tax spillovers.
However, when the median voter pays a small share of the taxes, he also fails to
internalize the full cost of the investment. This helps align his incentives with those of
future generations. Unfortunately, since the under-capitalization of tax spillovers can
be signiﬁcant (recall that
∂p
I
∂B → 0a sλx → 0), for plausible levels of progressivity the
land tax base still provides more IG incentives than the income tax base.






,w h i c hc a n
be negative even if L
∂pI(s)







, which can be positive even if L
∂pI(s)
∂s1 < 1.
16This is an unconventional measure of progressivity. However, it correlates well with standard
measures as long as land holdings increase with wealth.18
5.3 Non-separable Preferences
The basic results have been derived for the case of additively separable preferences,
where the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and land, and thus the
demand for land, are independent of G. T h i si sag o o da s s u m p t i o nf o rI P G ss u c h
as pure R&D, that are unrelated to land, but not for others, such as roads. In this
section we show that for most (but not all) IPGs, our results extend to the case of non-
separabilities. To simplify the analysis, suppose that there is not debt (Dmax =0 ) .
We begin by characterizing the capitalization function for both tax bases. Consider























∂s1 denotes the sized of the tax spillovers generated by an additional unit of
the IPG, and ∂GL
∂s1 the size of the beneﬁt spillover. As before, the tax spillover is
fully capitalized. The main diﬀerence is that non-separabilities also make possible the
capitalization of some of the beneﬁt spillovers, which before were not capitalized at
all. Since λp < 0, the extent to which they are capitalized depends on the sign and
magnitude of λG. Note, in particular, the capitalization of beneﬁt spillovers is driven
solely by the eﬀect of the public good on the taste for land; the direct value of the
spillovers for the next generation plays no role. Thus, a valuable beneﬁt spillover such
as more public parks and infrastructure can have a negative impact on land prices if it
is a substitute for land (λG > 0).
A similar expression is easily derived for the income tax base. With non-additive




























As before, the expression reduces to the case of non-separable preferences when λG ≈ 0,
and allows for the capitalization of beneﬁt spillovers when λG  =0 .
These arguments show that with non-separabilities both tax and beneﬁt spillovers
can be capitalized. The impact of this on IG incentives depends on the speciﬁc nature
of the IPG. Many IPGs, such as pure R&D, are orthogonal to land. In this case19
λG ≈ 0 is the empirically relevant assumption, the capitalization of beneﬁt spillovers
is negligible, and our previous results remain unchanged.
For IPGs that are suﬃciently strong complements to land, the addition of non-
separabilities shifts upwards the capitalization functions depicted in ﬁgures 2 and 3.
To be precise, the capitalization functions shift upwards only for values of s1 at which
an additional unit of the IPG generates a beneﬁt spillovers. Thus, in the case of
land taxes the capitalization function remains unchanged for s1 ∈ [0,G
L
], and is pos-
itive otherwise, and in the case of income taxes the capitalization function increases
throughout. It is straightforward to see that generation α’s incentives to invest, and




Finally, for IPGs that are suﬃciently strong substitutes for land, the addition of
non-separabilites shifts the capitalization functions downwards. In the case of income
taxation, the capitalization function shifts downwards throughout, further decreasing
the ability of this institution to generate investment in IPGs. By contrast, with land
taxes the capitalization function remains unchanged up to G
L
,a n db e c o m e sn e g a t i v e
afterwards. This has no eﬀect on the incentives of generation α.
5.4 Mobility
The previous results have established the advantages of using a land tax base in a
centralized institution. As we discussed in section 2, a related literature has shown
that inter-jurisdictional competition also generates some capitalization of IG spillovers.
This suggests a natural question: Do our results also hold in decentralized institutions?
Or does the choice of the tax base only matter at the central level?
The analysis of this case is complicated and is done in a companion paper. Rangel
and Conley (2002) compare the performance of four institutions: centralization and
land taxation, centralization and income taxation, decentralization and land taxation,
and decentralization and income taxation. The comparison shows that interjurisdic-
tional competition and land taxation are complementary mechanisms. Decentralization
generates full capitalization of beneﬁt, but not of tax spillovers. Land taxation gener-
ates full capitalization of tax, but not of beneﬁt spillovers. Thus, the choice of the tax
base is also important at the state and local level.
6 Conclusions: How to Protect Future Generations
Using Tax Base Restrictions
This paper has shown that the imposition of tax base restrictions can be used to protect
future generations from expropriation and to improve the eﬃciency of intergenerational20
investment. The choice of the tax base matters because it aﬀects the extent to which
tax spillovers are capitalized: with a land-type tax base there is full capitalization, with
an income tax base there is not.
Although our results have been developed in a highly stylized model, they suggest
that a constitutional reform requiring the use of a multi-tier tax system could have
a signiﬁcant impact on intergenerational exchange. In this type of tax system, the
government budget is divided into several well-deﬁned tiers, and hard constraints are
introduced into the tax base used to ﬁnance each tier. Our results suggest that there
should be at least two tiers: (1) an IG tier, which includes programs that generate IG
spillovers and debt; and (2) an intragenerational tier, which includes all other programs.
Our results suggest that the IG tier should be ﬁnanced exclusively with land taxes, but
they do not impose any constraints on the tax base for the intragenerational tier. Thus,
the system is compatible with other government objectives such as redistribution and
corrective taxation.
This type of tax system introduces constraints on the budget process. Every ﬁscal
year the government is free to choose how much to spend in each category, but is
constrained on the type and amount of taxes that it can use to ﬁnance the diﬀerent
expenditures. Furthermore, there is a strong degree of separability among the tiers.
As we have shown, present generations have an incentive to relabel programs so
that they can expropriate future generations. Thus, it is essential that the allocation
of the budget items to tiers be well-deﬁned and veriﬁable by a court, and that strong
supermajorities be required to modify the rules of the tax system.
Admittedly, given the existing legal frameworkand the state of accounting and
monitoring technology, it would impossible to create a constitutional framework that
completely rules out the use of accounting gimmicks. This caveat notwithstanding,
an institution that can guarantee that a suﬃciently large fraction of IG programs
is ﬁnanced with a land-type tax base would still improve the incentives of present
generations to care about the future.
Another diﬃculty in the practical implementation of a multi-tier tax system comes
from the fact that some government objectives require the use of IG transfers, which
as we have shown, are not possible with a land tax base. These activities include pay-
as-you go social insurance programs, the use of debt to smooth business cycles, and IG
risk-sharing. Thus, in order to protect future generations, the tax system needs to ﬁnd
a credible way of putting each one of these programs in a separate tier of the budget,
and to introduce appropriate restrictions on how they are ﬁnanced to insure that only
acceptable IG transfers take place. In the case of business cycles, the constitution could
require that a certain fraction of that type of debt be repaid whenever the economy
is in an expansion. In the case of social insurance, the constitution could require that21
any changes in the level of beneﬁts be ﬁnanced with a speciﬁc type of payroll taxes.
The multi-tier system described here resembles the type of capital budget institu-
tions that are common among the U.S. states in that it divides the budget into clearly
speciﬁed categories and introduces some restrictions in the budget process. The dif-
ference between the two institutions resides on the nature of the restrictions. Here the
government is free to choose expenditures and debt, but it is restricted on the type of
taxes that it can use to ﬁnance it. By contrast, in standard capital budgeting institu-
tions the government is constrained in its ability to spend and issue debt, but not in
the choice of tax instruments.
We emphasize that, in order to generate the necessary IG incentives, a constitution
needs to resort to a variety of mechanisms. The multi-tier system described here
combines an appropriate choice of a tax base with some of the features of capital
budgeting. The results in Rangel and Conley (2002) show that, for some types of
IPGs, decentralization provides additional incentives to invest optimally. Other useful
mechanisms are surely waiting to be discovered.
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Appendix
Proof of Property 1: The assumptions on preferences imply that: (1) λ(p|x)i sa
strictly positive and continuously diﬀerentiable function, (2) for all x>0, λ(p|x) > L
N
for p suﬃciently low, and (iii) for all x>0, λ(p|x) → 0a sp →∞ . These three
properties imply that there exists p such that λ(p|x)= L
N . Uniqueness follows from
t h ef a c tt h a ta tπ(x)t h eF O Cpu￿(x − p L
N)=v￿( L
N) must be satisﬁed, and the left
hand side of this condition is increasing in p.
P r o o fo fP r o p e r t i e s2a n d3 : Since π(x) is implicitly deﬁned by λ(π(x)|x)= L
N,
the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT) implies that ∂π
∂x = −λx
λp, and Property 3 follows.
Furthermore, since λ(π(x)|x) is deﬁned implicitly by π(x)u￿(x−π(x)l)=v￿(l), the IFT
implies that
λp
λx = −λ(π(x)|x)+ u
￿
pu￿￿ < −λ(π(x)|x). It follows that λ(π(x)|x)∂π
∂x < 1.
Since the assumptions on preferences imply that ∂π
∂x > 0, and by deﬁnition, λ(π(x)|x)=
L
N, Property 2 follows.







G − θI + D
N
)+h(G)
denote the level of IPGs that generation β would choose at t = 2 if the constraint
G ≥ θI in (5) and (9) were not binding. The assumptions on preferences imply that
∂G
u
∂w ∈ (0,N). It follows that ∂G
u













(0,1). Furthermore, by the Inada conditions, Gu(s,p)=0o n l yi fp = Nw+s−D
L .
Proof of Proposition 2:
(Step 1) We show that for any state s there exists a unique continuation equilibrium
and characterize its basic properties.
For any s the set of continuation equilibria is given by the intersection of the following








G − θI +D
N
)+h(G)].
This is the set of points (p,G) at which the conditions for political equilibrium are
satisﬁed. As depicted in ﬁgure 4, this locus satisﬁes the following properties: (1)
Gc(s,p)=m a x {Gu(s,p),s 1};( 2 )Gc(s,·)d e c r e a s e si np ∈ [0, ￿ p(s1)] and is ﬂat otherwise
(where ￿ p(0) = Nw−D
L , ￿ p(·)i sd e c r e a s i n gi ns1,a n d￿ p(s1) = 0 for all suﬃciently large
s1); (3) ∂Gc
∂p = − L
N
∂Gu
∂w ∈ (−L,0) if p<￿ p(s1); and (4) the locus Gc(s,·)s h i f t su p w a r d s
with s1, and downwards with D.25
The second locus is given by the set of points (π(w −
D+max{G−θI,0}
N ),G) that satisfy
the conditions for a land market equilibrium. As shown in ﬁgure 4, this locus satisﬁes
the following properties: (1) it crosses the horizontal axis at a price ￿ p ∈ (0, Nw−D
L )a n d
then increases vertically up to the point (￿ p,s1); (2) it decreases for p ∈ [0, ￿ p] and, since
∂π
∂G = − 1
N
∂π
∂x ∈ (− 1
L,0), Property 2 implies that the slope is between −∞ and −L;( 3 )
it shifts to the left as D increases.
The properties of the two loci imply that: (1) they intersect exactly once, (2) the price
at the intersection is less than Nw−D
L and thus cI(s) > 0, (3) for all D there exists
G
I
(D) such that G(s1,D)=s1 if s1 ≥ G
I
(D), and G(s1,D) >s 1 otherwise, and (4)
G
I
(D) decreases with D.
(Step 2) Now we show how changes in s aﬀect the continuation equilibrium. There
a r et w op o s s i b l ec a s e s :
Case 1: s1 < G
I
(D). In this case (pI(s),G I(s)) is given by the unique solution to the
following system of equations:
p = π(w −








G − θI +D
N
).


































∂x − 1) −Nh￿￿.






Case 2: s1 ≥ G
I
(D). In this case (pI(s),G I(s)) = (π(w − D






∂D = − 1
N
∂π
∂x. Property 2 implies that L
∂p
I
∂D ∈ (−1,0). The properties of EI(·)
then follow from the fact that EI(s)=GI(s) −s1.
(Step 3) Parts (iii) and (iv) of the proposition follow directly from the properties of
the capitalization function and the fact that, by Proposition 1,
∂p
I
∂s1 → 0a sλx → 0.
(Step 4) Finally we show that GI isineﬃcient. Thereare two cases. If EI(θII,D max) >
0, (5) implies that the FOC u￿(cI(s)) = Nh￿(GI) is satisﬁed. If EI(θII,D max)=0 ,
the arguments in step 1 imply that GI = G
I
(Dmax), and as a result the same FOC
must be satisﬁed. In either case generation β’s aggregate willingness to pay for an ad-
ditional unit of IPGs is 1. This exceeds 1
θ, the marginal cost of producing an additional
unit of IPGs. Since generation β is at an interior allocation, it follows that a Pareto
improvement is possible.
Proof of Proposition 3:26
(Step 1) We show that for every state s there exists at most one continuation equilib-
rium. As in the previous proof, the continuation equilibria is given by the intersection
of the following loci in (p,G) space. The ﬁrst locus is given by the set of points
(p,Gc(s,p)) that satisfy the conditions for political equilibrium. The properties of this
locus are described in step 1 of the previous proof.
The second locus is given by the set of points (p￿(G,s),G)t h a ts a t i s f yt h el a n dm a r k e t
clearing conditions. Property 1 implies that p￿(G,s)=π(w) −
D+max{G−θI,0}
L .I t
follows that the locus satisﬁes the following properties: (1) it crosses the horizontal
axis at a price ￿ p = π(w) − D
L and then increases vertically up to the point (￿ p,s1), (2)
for p ∈ [0, ￿ p] it decreases linearly with slope −L; and (3) increases in D shift the locus
to the left.
The properties of the two loci imply that they can intersect at most once.
(Step 2) By step 1, to show that EL(s)=m a x {G
L
− θI,0} and pL(s)=π(w) −
(D+max{G
L−θI,0})
L is the unique continuation equilibrium it suﬃces to check that it
satisﬁes conditions (8) and (9).
(Step 3) Parts (iii) and (iv) follow directly from the properties of the capitalization
function. The argument for why GL is Pareto ineﬃcient is analogous to the one in step
4 in the previous proof and thus is omitted.
























Parts (i) and (iv) of Proposition 2 imply that GI ≤ G
I
(Dmax), with strict inequality if
θ or λx are small. Step 1 in the previous proof shows that G
I
(D) is strictly decreasing








with strict inequality if θ or λx are small or if Dmax > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The proof of the case or pure IPGs is given in the text. Consider the case of reversible
IPGs. The following steps characterize the unique equilibrium allocations generated
by the two institutions. Since the arguments are similar to those in the proofs of
propositions 2 and 3 we only provide a sketch of the proof.
(Step 1) Consider the case of a land tax base. An argument analogous to the one in
step 1 of the previous proof shows that for every s there exists at most one continuation27
equilibrium. It is then straightforward to check that EL(s)=￿ GL − s1 and pL(s)=
π(w)−
D+EL(s)
L satisfy the conditions for land market clearing and political equilibrium
in period 2. It follows that L
∂pL
∂s1 = 1 for all s1 and that L
∂pL
∂D = −1. Given this,
generation α’s best response is to choose (DI,II)=( 0 ,Nw), which is Pareto optimal.
(Step 2) Consider the case of an income tax base. The arguments in steps 1 and 2
in the proof of Proposition 2 go through virtually unmodiﬁed. In fact, the arguments
are simpler since we do not have to worry about corner solutions: the outcome of the
election of at t =2i sg i v e nb yGu(s,p). It follows that generation α sets II = 0 unless
θ and λx are suﬃciently large.
Proof of Proposition 5:
For k = L,I, and any state s,l e tWk(s) denote the wealth of generation α and Uk(s)
denote the payoﬀ of generation β. Wk = Wk(θIk,Dk)a n dUk = Uk(θIk,Dk)d e n o t e
the payoﬀ at the outcomes generated by the institutions.
(Step 1) Proposition 3 implies that Wk = Lπ(w) − G
L














,0) = π(w). It follows that with an income tax base generation α
can replicate the outcome of L by choosing (II,DI)=( G
L
θ ,0). Revealed preference
then implies that WI ≥ WI(G
L








N )+h(s1 +EI(s)) implies that
∂Uk(s)
∂s1
























To sign this derivative note that there are two possible cases. When EI(s) > 0t h e
FOC h￿ = u
￿
N holds and thus
∂U
k(s)
∂s1 > 0. When EI(s)=0 ,
∂pI
∂s1 =0a n dh￿ < u
￿
N ,w h i c h
also imply that the derivative is positive. This implies that UI ≤ UI(G
I
(Dmax),D max),
with strict inequality if II < G
I
(Dmax).
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Figure 4: Proof of Proposition 2 - necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a continuation
equilibrium